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Abstract
Machine learning is often used in competitive scenarios: Participants learn and fit static models, and those models
compete in a shared platform. The common assumption is that in order to win a competition one has to have the best
predictive model, i.e., the model with the smallest out-sample error. Is that necessarily true? Does the best theoretical
predictive model for a target always yield the best reward in a competition? If not, can one take the best model
and purposefully change it into a theoretically inferior model which in practice results in a higher competitive edge?
How does that modification look like? And finally, if all participants modify their prediction models towards the best
practical performance, who benefits the most? players with inferior models, or those with theoretical superiority? The
main theme of this paper is to raise these important questions and propose a theoretical model to answer them. We
consider a study case where two linear predictive models compete over a shared target. The model with the closest
estimate gets the whole reward, which is equal to the absolute value of the target. We characterize the reward function
of each model, and using a basic game theoretic approach, demonstrate that the inferior competitor can significantly
improve his performance by choosing optimal model coefficients that are different from the best theoretical prediction.
This is a preliminary study that emphasizes the fact that in many applications where predictive machine learning is at
the service of competition, much can be gained from practical (back-testing) optimization of the model compared to
static prediction improvement.
1 Introduction
Machine learning is often used in competitive scenarios: Participants learn and fit static models, and those models
compete in a shared platform. The common assumption is that in order to win a competition one has to have the best
learning model, i.e., the model with the smallest out-sample error. Is that necessarily true? The main theme of this
paper is to raise this important question and propose a theoretical model to answer it.
In competitive machine learning, every player has a predictive model for the target, and the closest, the fastest or the
most reliable model wins. What distinguishes this from static learning problems is that in a competition, target and
rewards are shared among all players, and the distribution of rewards is not necessarily the same as that of competitors’
model merits. For instance, the rules may dictate that absolute winners take all or most of the rewards, while everyone
else gets nothing [1, 2]. In other words, a learning model that is really good but not quite the best can earn as much
as a very poor model. The best example of this is in a one-time bidding game: The closest bid to the fair value of
an asset wins the auction, and the reward is the underlying transaction [3] (which may or may not be an appealing
reward after all). The merit of a prediction can be assessed in the time domain as opposed to the space of target unit,
or some combination of both. This is for example the case in High-Frequency electronic trading: The trader who
has the fastest realization of a fair quote, and consequently the shortest reaction time, has the highest fill ratio, and
is able to secure a profit above the transaction cost [4]. Meanwhile the slow trader’s fate is doomed at missed fills
or adverse selection [5, 6]. The extent of competitive machine learning is vast. Bidding and auction models are used
in various on-line platforms where big data and AI play important roles, including e-commerce, travel reservation,
on-line advertising and many more [7,8]. Many marketing businesses revolve around competing over a shared pool of
targeted customers’ attentions (reward) by designing smarter recommendation algorithms (prediction models) [9, 10].
Ride sharing rivals use machine learning algorithms to predict surge times and provide recommendations or incentives
to drivers for more rides and lower pickup times [11]. Machine learning is now an essential part of air traffic control,
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which is another example of an interactive platform of rewards (faster routs) and losses (delays) [12]. In fact, with
the exception of applications in natural sciences and bio-informatics, there is an element of competition in almost all
practical machine learning problems.
Key Questions. Noting the essence of competitive machine learning, we now ask the previous question again. Does
the best theoretical predictive model for a target always yield the best reward in a competition? If not, can one take
the best model and purposefully change it into a theoretically inferior model which in practice results in a higher
competitive edge? How does that modification look like? And finally, if all participants gear their prediction models
towards the best practical performance, who benefits the most? players with inferior models, or those with theoretical
superiority? These are some very important questions that have never been formally stated and studied to the best of
the authors’ knowledge.
Our Contributions. We provide a theoretical framework to answer the above raised questions. We consider a simple
case where two participants, A and B, compete over a shared target. Each participant has a prediction model for the
target value, and the player with the closest prediction collects the entire reward, which is equal to the absolute value
of the target. The inferior player earns nothing. The predictions are based on underlying machine learning models
that each player has independently built and trained. To make the study feasible, we focus on a simple case of linear
prediction models: The target resource is the linear sum of n underlying independent factors (features). Each player
has access to a limited subset of those factors (S1, S2), and unlimited training data. We also make the assumption of
“linear knowledge” regime, which means |S1|/n,|S2|/n and |S1 ∩ S2|/n are all constants. Each player can obtain his
best theoretical prediction for the target. We study this problem in a game theoretic framework. A “strategy” for each
player is defined as a linear prediction model using the available features with a particular set of coefficients. We show
that this is a constant-sum game where the expected reward of every player can be fully characterized and computed
for any pair of selected strategies. We focus on a class of strategies where the models’ coefficients are “symmetric”
with respect to both features sets. We show that for symmetric pure strategies, play A’s reward is R1 = cn where
c > 0 is a computable constant. When both players use their theoretical models, R1 = c1n for some other c1 > 0.
We further demonstrate that each player can secure a max-min reward over all symmetric strategies. This allows us
to prove that the guaranteed reward for player A is c∗n for some other constant c∗. We numerically demonstrate that
in most cases c∗/c1 > 1, if A is the inferior player (i.e. |S1| < |S2|). In other words, the inferior player can gain
additional reward from practical (e.g. back-testing or real-world) optimization of his model coefficients, and c∗/c1
can be as high as 1.8. This is a fascinating counter intuitive result. It basically means that the inferior player can pur-
posefully tweak his theoretical prediction model into another model that performs up to 1.8 times better in competitive
learning, despite having a higher mean-square prediction error. Additionally, by looking into the chosen coefficients,
we observe that the model tweaking (including both shared and unique features) always consists of magnifying the
coefficients, though we cannot mathematically prove this latter point at present.
2 Competitive Linear Models
Suppose there are two players A and B who are competing to predict a target value y and collect rewards as a result of
their predictions. We model y as the linear combination of n features x1, ..., xn:
y =
∑
16i6n
xi
xi ∼ N (0, 1) (1)
where xis are independent from each other. The players each make an estimation about y by using a subset of the
features. In other words, A has access to a subset of features indexed in S1 ⊂ Zn+1 \ {0}, and B has access to another
subset of features indexed in S2 ⊂ Zn+1 \ {0}. Without loss of generality, we assume that |S1| < |S2|, so player A
is at a theoretical disadvantage. Let us call the estimations of the two players y1 and y2. The game rules dictates that
whoever has the closest estimation wins all of the reward, which in this case is proportional to the absolute resource
value |y|. Therefore, for a particular instance, the reward for the two players is as follows:
r1 = |y|1 (|e1| < |e2|) , r2 = |y|1 (|e1| > |e2|) , (2)
2
where e1 = y−y1 and e2 = y−y2 are the prediction errors. The competition is only meaningful in a statistical sense,
therefore the average rewards should be considered:
R1 = E{|y|1 (|e1| < |e2|)}, R2 = E{|y|1 (|e1| > |e2|)}, (3)
Note that based on this definitionR1 +R2 = E|y|, therefore we are dealing with a constant-sum game. The theoretical
best estimations for y1 and y2 are the maximum likelihood estimations:
y
(T )
1 =
∑
i∈S1
xi, y
(T )
2 =
∑
i∈S2
xi (4)
Assuming players have had sufficiently large sets of training data, a linear regression will yield the above theoretical
models. However, we consider the possibility that each player can choose a different prediction model. We limit the
study to the set of all linear prediction models. A pair of strategies for A and B can be represented with a pair of
coefficient vectors α1 = (α11, · · · , α1n), and α2 = (α21, · · · , α2n), where the corresponding prediction models are:
y1 =
∑
i∈S1
α1,ixi, y2 =
∑
i∈S2
α2,ixi (5)
We also consider the linear knowledge regime where the following holds for some constants g1, g2, g12:
|S1| = g1n, |S2| = g2n, |S1 ∩ S2| = g12n. (6)
2.1 A Simple Example
Consider the following simple example consisting of four variables:
y = x1 + x2 + x3 + x4,
y1 = α1x1 + α2x2, y2 = β1x2 + β2x3 + β3x4 (7)
For further simplicity, let us also assume that xis can randomly take values in {0, 1} with equal probabilities instead of
normal distribution. Player A has an inferior prediction model due to lower number of available features. It is possible
to list out error values and rewards for all 16 possible combinations of xis, as demonstrated in Table 1.
Table 1: Values of errors, target and reward for player A for different possible combinations of features values.
x1x2x3x4 e1 e2 y r1
0000 0 0 0 0
0001 1 1− β3 1 1(1 < |1− β3|)
0010 1 1− β2 1 1(1 < |1− β2|)
0011 2 2− β2 − β3 1 2× 1(2 < |2− β2 − β3|)
0100 1− α2 1− β1 1 1(|1− α2| < |1− β1|)
0101 2− α2 2− β1 − β3 2 2× 1(|2− α2| < |2− β1 − β3|)
0110 2− α2 2− β1 − β2 2 2× 1(|2− α2| < |2− β1 − β2|)
0111 3− α2 3− β1 − β2 − β3 3 2× 1(|3− α2| < |3− β1 − β2 − β3|)
1000 1− α1 1 1 1(|1− α1| < 1)
1001 2− α1 2− β3 2 2× 1(|2− α1| < |2− β3|)
1010 2− α1 2− β2 2 2× 1(|2− α1| < |2− β2|)
1011 3− α1 3− β2 − β3 3 3× 1(|3− α1| < |3− β2 − β3|)
1100 2− α1 − α2 2− β1 2 2× 1(|2− α1 − α2| < |2− β1|)
1101 3− α1 − α2 3− β1 − β3 3 3× 1(|3− α1 − α2| < |3− β1 − β3|)
1110 3− α1 − α2 3− β1 − β2 3 3× 1(|3− α1 − α2| < |3− β1 − β2|)
1111 3− α1 − α2 4− β1 − β2 − β3 4 4× 1(|4− α1 − α2| < |4− β1 − β2 − β3|)
From there, the expected reward of A is computable for every setting of αis and βis, which is essentially the average
of column r1 is table 1. The total expected reward R1 + R2 in this case is E|y| = 2. When both players use their
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respective theoretical models, i.e. αi = 1 ∀1 6 i 6 2 and βi = 1 ∀1 6 i 6 3, thenR1 = 0.1875 which is considerably
lower than R2 = 1.8125. For further simplicity, let us now assume that the players are only allowed to choose from
strategies with equal coefficients, i.e. α1 = α2 = α, and β1 = β2 = β3 = β. If player A unilaterally chooses a
prediction model different than the theoretical model, then the reward profile looks as Figure 1 for different values of
α. The reward peak is very close to a fair split. To achieve this, A must use an exaggerated model with 1.5 < α < 2.
An intuitive justification is that by choosing larger coefficients, the chance of conceding a smaller error value becomes
lower for A. However, this will also increase the (conditional) chance of winning tail events where target values are
larger.
Figure 1: Reward of player A if the opponent sticks to the best theoretical prediction model.
Obviously, if B is smart he will not permit a significant loss and will try to adapt his strategy as well. From a game-
theoretic perspective, there is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium [13], which in this case is the solution of the minmax
problem over all mixed strategies [14]. However, our focus here is solely on pure strategies, and from that angle, A
can at least guarantee the following maxmin value:
max
α
min
β
R1(α, β) (8)
The heat map of R1 as a function of α, β is illustrated in Figure 2. α = 2.1 leads to a guaranteed (maxmin) reward of
0.6875 for player A, which is more than 3.5 times what he can earn with the theoretical model.
4
 Figure 2: Reward of player A as a function of coefficient values (strategies) α, β.
3 Derivations and Results
We now turn our attention back to the generic model of (1) and study it more rigorously. Our first result states that for
every strategy pair the reward is computable.
Theorem 1. For every strategy pair (α1,α2):
R1 =
∫
x
|x1|1 (|x2| < |x3|) Φ0,Σ(x)dx, (9)
where Φ0,Σ is the pdf of the 3d-normal distribution with mean zero and covariance Σ =
 1 v01 v02v01 v11 v12
v02 v12 v22
, where:
v01 = |Sc1|+
∑
i∈S1
(1− α1,i),
v02 = |Sc2|+
∑
i∈S2
(1− α2,i),
v12 = |Sc1 ∩ Sc2|+
∑
i∈Sc1∩S2
(1− α2,i) +
∑
i∈S1∩Sc2
(1− α1,i) +
∑
i∈S1∩S2
(1− α1,i)(1− α2,i),
v11 = |Sc1|+
∑
i∈S1
(1− α1,i)2,
v22 = |Sc2|+
∑
i∈S2
(1− α2,i)2.
The integral of (14) can be computed within any arbitrary precision by using the method of sigma points based on
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physical Hermite polynomials Hn(x) [15]:∫
x
|x1|1 (|x2| < |x3|) Φ0,Σ(x)dx = lim
m→∞
∑
16i,j,k6m
W (i,j,k) · |T (i,j,k)1 | · 1
(
|T (i,j,k)2 | < |T (i,j,k)3 |
)
T (i,j,k) =
√
ΣZ(i,j,k),W (i,j,k) = wiwjwk, Z
(i,j,k) = (ζi, ζj , ζk) , (10)
where ζ(i)s are the roots of Hm(x), and wi = m!/(n2H2m−1(ζ
(i))).
Using the premises of elementary game theory, one can easily deduce that player A can secure the following reward:
R∗1 = max
α1
min
α2
R1. (11)
However, despite computability of the reward function, any optimization over α1,α2 involves O(n) variables. There-
fore any attempt to derive explicit or computable relationships for R∗1 is hopeless. To facilitate this computation, we
need to make the following definition:
Definition A strategy α1 for player A is called model-symmetric (or symmetric in brief) if
α1,i =
{
a11 ∀ i ∈ S1 ∩ Sc2
a12 ∀ i ∈ S1 ∩ S2 , (12)
for some real scalars a11, a12. We use the notation α1 = h(a11, a12), and denote the set of all model-symmetric
strategies for player A withH1. A strategy α2 for player B is called model-symmetric if
α2,i =
{
a21 ∀ i ∈ S2 ∩ Sc1
a22 ∀ i ∈ S1 ∩ S2 , (13)
for some real scalars a21, a22. We use the notation α2 = h(a21, a22), and denote the set of all model-symmetric
strategies for player B withH2. We also defineH = H1 ×H2.
The next corollary states that for model-symmetric strategies the reward is R1 = cn, where c is independent of n and
only depends on parameters of the linear knowledge regime. It follows immediately from Theorem 1 and the definition
of symmetric strategies.
Corollary 1.1. If α1 = h(a11, a12) and α2 = h(a21, a22) are model-symmetric strategies, then R1 = nUg(a1, a2),
where:
Ug(a1, a2) =
∫
x
|x1|1 (|x2| < |x3|) Φ0,Σ(x)dx (14)
where Φ0,Σ is the pdf of 3d-normal distribution with mean zero and covariance Σ =
 1 v01 v02v01 v11 v12
v02 v12 v22
, and:
v01 = (1− g1) + (1− a11)(g1 − g12) + (1− a12)g12,
v02 = (1− g2) + (1− a21)(g2 − g12) + (1− a22)g12,
v12 = (1− g1 − g2 + g12) + (1− a11)(g1 − g12) + (1− a21)(g2 − g12) + (1− a12)(1− a22)g12,
v11 = (1− g1) + (1− a11)2(g1 − g12) + (1− a12)2g12,
v22 = (1− g2) + (1− a21)2(g2 − g12) + (1− a22)2g12,
a1 = [a11, a12], a2 = [a21, a22], g = [g1, g2, g12].
Theorem 2. R∗1 > max
α1
min
α2
(α1,α2)∈H
R1(α1, α2) = nmax
a2∈R2
min
a1∈R2
Ug(a1, a2).
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Proof: we only need to show that for a symmetric α1, the minimizer α2 of R(α1,α2) must be symmetric too.
if i and j are two indices in Sc1 ∩ S2, then any change in the values of α2,i and α2,j only effect v0,2 = cov(y, e2) and
v2,2 = var(e2) (recall the notations of model covariances in Theorem 1). Let α∗2 be the minimizer of R2 and v
∗
0,2, and
v∗22 be the resulting values for v0,2 and v22. Define a new vector α2 which is equal to α
∗
2 in every coordinate except i
and j, where α2,i = α2,j = (α∗2,i + α
∗
2,j)/2. We can conclude that:
v0,2 − v∗0,2 = 0, (15)
v2,2 − v∗2,2 = 2(1− (α∗2,i + α∗2,j)/2)2 − (1− α∗2,i)2 − (1− α∗2,j)2 = −(α∗2,i − α∗2,j)2/2 6 0. (16)
This means that α2 results in a model for B which has the same covariance with the target, but smaller or equal error
variance, while everything else remains the same. Such a model is equal or superior for player B. Therefore R1 gets
smaller which contradicts the choice of α∗2, unless α
∗
2,i = α
∗
2,i. Similarly for two indices i, j in S1 ∩ S2, a similar
transformation ofα∗ results in a model with smaller or equal v2,2 and identical v0,2. In this case sinceα1 has only one
unique value, v1,2 will remain the same as well. Thus a similar argument holds, and the values of i and j coordinates
in α∗2 are identical.
Based on theorem 2, we can use a computational optimization over four variable a1, a2, b1, b2 to obtain a lower bound
for the guaranteed rate of the inferior player R∗1. For simplicity, let us define:
U1g = Ug ((1, 1), (1, 1)) , U
∗
g = maxa2∈R2
min
a1∈R2
Ug(a1, a2). (17)
U1g is the (normalized) reward of player A when both players use their theoretical prediction models, while U
∗
g is the
conservative guaranteed reward if player A chooses an optimally distorted model. The ratio U∗g /U
1
g is therefore the
game-theoretic notion of “gain” that player A can achieve in this competition by optimizing his model’s coefficients.
Based on Theorem 2 and Corollary 1.1, a lower bound for this gain is completely computable for every regime vector
g. We have computed and will present this for a special case where g12 = g1g2. This case presents a “typical” subsets
intersection for large n if S1 and S2 are selected independently and uniformly. The 2d plots of U1g and U
∗
g /U
1
g as
functions of g1, g2 are depicted in Figures 3a and 3b respectively. Note that the gain can be as large as 1.8 for player
A. In general, the more inferior A (the smaller g1/g2), the larger the gain.
(a) U1g . (b) U∗g /U1g .
Figure 3: Scaled reward of player A and the lower bound on achievable gain by optimizing the model coefficient for
g12 = g1g2.
7
4 Conclusion
We introduced a game theoretic framework for studying the performance of predictive linear models in competitions.
We focused on a two player competition, and demonstrated that if both players put aside the theoretical predictions
of the target, and optimize their corresponding models based on the practical reward, then the player with the inferior
prediction gains extra rewards. The reward can be significant depending on the players’ knowledge regimes. This
underlines the value of model optimization beyond the theoretical prediction. A more rigorous future study shall
consider the following further directions: 1) devising an analytical study for the trade-off between cost of feature
(knowledge) expansion and reward enhancement, 1) obtaining theoretical characterizations of optimal coefficients for
each player, 2) studying mixed strategies and minmax equilibrium, which leads to suggestions for model combination
(e.g., alpha combination in trading and investment), 3) studying the problem in a dynamic setup where players adap-
tively optimize their models. One can potentially characterize the convergence of the system and propose efficient
learning/optimization algorithms for the latter problem. 4) Studying a multi-player game where features access has a
particular distribution among a large number of players. Understanding the optimization gain of players as a function
of where in the spectrum of knowledge they stand is a challenging and important practical problems that conforms to
asymptotic cases of real world competitive applications.
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